Política Fiscal Y Monetaria: Problemas De Coordinación (Teoría Y Experiencia De Rusia) by Sukharev, Alexander et al.
.  
Vol. 8, No. 15, Enero - Junio 2020                          REICE                   ISSN: 2308-782X 
 
Página | 
242 
REICE | 
242 
REICE 
Revista Electrónica de Investigación en Ciencias Económicas 
Abriendo Camino al Conocimiento 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, UNAN-Managua 
  
Vol. 8, No. 15, Enero – Junio 2020                                  REICE       ISSN: 2308-782X 
http://revistacienciaseconomicas.unan.edu.ni/index.php/REICE 
revistacienciaseconomicas@gmail.com 
 
  
Fiscal And Monetary Policy: Problems Of Coordination (Theory And Experience Of 
Russia) 
 
Política Fiscal Y Monetaria: Problemas De Coordinación (Teoría Y Experiencia De 
Rusia) 
 
Fecha recepción: abril 12 del 2020 
Fecha aceptación: mayo 24  del 2020 
 
Alexander Sukharev 
Professor of the Department of constitutional, administrative and customs law of Tver 
state University  
Correo: su500005@yandex.ru 
ID ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7833-2484  
 
Olga Smirnova 
Associate Professor, head of the Department of Economics and Finance of the Tver 
branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public 
Administration. 
Correo: smirnova-tgu@yandex.ru 
ID ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6506-9370 
 
Nelly Orlova 
Acting Director of the Tver Branch of the Russian Presidential Academy of National 
Economy and Public Administration  
Correo: director@tver.ranepa.ru 
ID ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7788-3054 
 
DOI 10.5377/reice.v8i15.9956 
 
 
Derechos de autor 2018 REICE: Revista Electrónica de Investigación en Ciencias Económicas.  Esta obra está 
bajo licencia internacional CreativeCommons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.Copyright 
(c) Revista Electrónica de Investigación en Ciencias Económicas de la Unan- Managua
 Fiscal And Monetary Policy: Problems Of Coordination (Theory And Experience Of Russia 
Vol. 8, No. 15, Enero - Junio 2020                          REICE                   ISSN: 2308-782X 
 
REICE | 
243 
Abstract. 
 
The issues of interaction between monetary and financial authorities in the framework of 
effective policy aimed at achieving stabilization and development of the economy are 
considered. Coordination of actions of monetary and financial authorities is considered in 
the context of anti-cyclical and non-cyclical economic policy. Special attention is paid to 
coordinating actions in this area between the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and 
the Government of the Russian Federation 
 
Keywords:  The dichotomy of economic policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy, economic 
power, monetary power, financial power, RF Stabilization Fund 
 
Resumen 
Se consideran los problemas de interacción entre las autoridades monetarias y 
financieras en el marco de una política efectiva dirigida a lograr la estabilización y el 
desarrollo de la economía. La coordinación de las acciones de las autoridades monetarias 
y financieras se considera en el contexto de una política económica anticíclica y no cíclica. 
Se presta especial atención a la coordinación de acciones en esta área entre el Banco 
Central de la Federación de Rusia y el Gobierno de la Federación de Rusia. 
 
Palabras Claves:  La dicotomía de la política económica, la política fiscal, la política 
monetaria, el poder económico, el poder monetario, el poder financiero 
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Introduction 
 
The economic policy of modern states is represented by a dichotomy, i.e. by the 
division into two parts. It is carried out by two, and, usually, independent macroeconomic 
entities - the government and the central bank. The government provides fiscal policy and 
the central bank provides monetary policy. Accordingly, each of them has its own arsenal 
of economic instruments: the government can manipulate taxes and budget expenditures 
(with the approval of the parliament), and the central bank can manipulate the volume of 
money supply, the required reserve ratio and discount rate. It is also believed that the 
government can make proper effect on the internal balance in the national economy, and 
the central bank - on the external balance (Lindert, 1992). Internal balance is the 
achievement of full employment and the full volume of production by economy, and 
external balance is the achievement of payment equilibrium. 
It is customary to proceed from the presence of internal and external lags in 
economic dichotomy, - a temporary measurement of economic policy measure effects 
(Hendershott, 1996). The internal lag is the time to make a decision in the field of 
economic policy, and the external lag is the time from making a decision to obtaining the 
result from the application of economic policy measures. The internal and external lags 
are asymmetric in duration for the government and the central bank. The government has 
a large internal lag and a small external lag, while the central bank has the opposite. This 
is because government decision-making requires parliamentary approval, which 
lengthens the time for making an economic decision, and the governing and decision-
making body of the central bank can meet at any time (there are the cases of convening 
it at night in order to make a quick decision without waiting till the morning when trading 
platforms are open) when it is necessary. A longer external lag at the central bank is 
explained by the peculiarities of the monetary policy transfer mechanism as compared to 
the direct fiscal policy mechanism. The alignment of fiscal and monetary policies should 
take into account the presence of such asymmetric lags. This is especially true of external 
lags, which are difficult to coordinate during balanced macroeconomic policy goal 
achievement. 
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The interaction between the monetary and financial authorities can occur in the 
framework of countercyclical, stabilization and other policies. The countercyclical policy 
aims to smooth out fluctuations in business activity and related fluctuations in key 
macroeconomic indicators. The countercyclical policy is based on taking into account 
periodically repeating phases of ups and downs in the economy (in a milder interpretation 
- the phases of economic dynamics acceleration and deceleration). Stabilization policy is 
aimed at economic shock prevention of a non-cyclical nature. 
Methods and Materials  
 
In general, the instruments of countercyclical policy and stabilization policy 
coincide. There may be the cases when stabilization policy becomes the basis for a 
countercyclical policy development. The state implements the measures of 
macroeconomic stabilization, and then creates a countercyclical mechanism on this basis 
to stabilize future socio-economic development. 
The potential for the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is influenced by the 
status and level of the economic power public authority. In this regard, Volkov I.I. shows 
that there are four possible options for interaction between the central bank and the 
ministry of finance, depending on the degree of their political influence. The first two 
options suggest that the central bank and the ministry of finance have the same political 
weight and their actions may be coordinated or not coordinated. The other two options 
are based on different political status of the central bank and the ministry of finance: either 
the central bank has greater political influence in the economic sphere, or the ministry of 
finance has it (Volkov, 2017). Thus, the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies is not 
abstract logical, but purely socio-political, institutional. 
Results and Analysis 
 
Cyclical Coordination Of Monetary And Fiscal Policy And The Problem Of Asymmetry 
The cyclical coordination of monetary and fiscal policy involves the coordination of 
macroeconomic policy nature and direction between the central bank and the government. 
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Countercyclical policies can be expansionist, restrictive, and neutral. The expansionist 
policy is aimed at economic growth stimulation, the restriction policy is aimed at inflation 
suppression or excessive market boom, the national economy overheating. Neutral policy 
is more likely a transitional state between these two extremes. Here the state is moving 
away from the current impact on macroeconomic parameters. 
Logically, nine combinations are possible in countercyclical policies (Table 1), 
depending on the compatibility of the monetary and financial authority policy. For example, 
it is possible when monetary policy is restrictive and fiscal policy is expansionary. This 
situation does not reflect the inconsistency of two economic authorities, but the need for 
different measures to influence the internal and external equilibrium of the national 
economy. Restrictive monetary policy will be aimed at inflation prevention, and 
expansionary fiscal policy will be aimed at economic growth stimulation. Thus, the 
economic growth increase will be achieved within lower inflation rates (Sukharev, 2010).          
Table 1. The matrix of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy options * 
Types and trends 
of economic 
policy 
Taxation and budgetary policy 
Expansionist Neutral Restrictive 
M
o
n
e
ta
ry
-c
re
d
it
 p
o
lic
y
 
Expansionis
t 
Expansionist  Conditionally neutral 
policy 
(conditionally 
expansionist) 
Multidirectional 
policy 
Neutral Conditionally 
neutral policy 
Neutral policy Conditionally 
neutral policy 
Restrictive  Multidirectional 
policy 
Conditionally neutral 
policy 
(conditionally restrictive) 
Restrictive 
* Author development.  
Possible combinations in countercyclical policy are not limited to those nine 
combinations shown in the table. 1, which may be even greater, taking into account the 
number of the monetary and financial authority instruments. The monetary authorities 
usually have three “standard” instruments: money supply, reserve requirements and 
 Fiscal And Monetary Policy: Problems Of Coordination (Theory And Experience Of Russia 
Vol. 8, No. 15, Enero - Junio 2020                          REICE                   ISSN: 2308-782X 
 
REICE | 
247 
discount rates, while the financial authorities have two instruments: taxes and budget 
expenditures. In total, the economic authorities have five “basic” instruments, each of 
which they can use in one of three regimes - expansionist, restrictive and neutral. Thus, 
we get the number of options equal to 53 = 125. If we add such tool as cyclical adjustment 
of bank capital to this list that has become frequently used, then 63 = 216 economic 
solutions will be in the arsenal of economic authorities. Thus, the more economic 
authorities have economic instruments, the greater their ability to influence the 
macroeconomic system. As J. Tinbergen once showed, the number of economic 
instruments should be no less than the number of economic goals. The main thing is to 
ensure consistency in their application and the correct assessment of macroeconomic 
consequences. 
As the part of the cyclical coordination of the monetary and financial authority 
actions, a variety of combinations of various macroeconomic indicators can be achieved. 
The central problem here is the harmonization of the interests for these two types of 
economic authorities. It should be borne in mind that some of the actions of economic 
authorities can be considered unpopular and cause sharp criticism from economists, 
politicians, the media and society as a whole. In other words, different options for 
economic decisions are politically non-neutral. For the government, some criticism for its 
unpopular decisions can cause its resignation, and for the central bank, it can lead to the 
loss of independence and the removal of its head and the members of the board of 
directors from the office. This limits the actions of economic authorities on the adoption of 
certain effective decisions and the refusal to interact with another center of economic 
power. For example, lowering and raising taxes has a diametrically opposite political 
effect, and it cannot be carried out within the framework of the economic cycle. Taxes are 
easy to reduce, but difficult to raise (Turow, 1999). The budget surplus, which is seen as 
unfunded social programs, lower salaries of budget workers, and so on, can also be 
criticized. Society is more likely to be favorably disposed to the government, whose policy 
will ensure the approval of a deficit state budget, than to one whose budget will be surplus. 
Criticism of the central bank may be possible due to the formation of significant 
international reserves, which are considered as the refusal to use financial resources for 
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domestic financing of the national economy. Also, central banks should implement such 
monetary policy options that would not lead to the loss of their capital (Smirnova, 2014), 
and, if possible, to obtain a positive financial result. Although central banks are usually 
created as non-profit organizations, they receive profit from the performance of their 
functions, and the loss would be perceived as the result of incorrect decisions of the board 
of directors of the central bank, which would initiate the the issue of its monetary 
remuneration reduction (Fiscal policy, public debt and monetary policy in emerging market 
economies, 2012). 
Thus, countercyclical economic policy is asymmetric, which must be taken into 
account in reality. Partial overcoming of this limitation is possible by a special financial 
mechanism development for the redistribution of economic benefits and losses between 
the central bank and the state budget in the framework of cyclical fluctuations of the 
national economy. Within such fluctuations, some economic authorities may receive 
economic benefits, while others may suffer losses. The consolidated account of economic 
authorities is not as volatile as it is with respect to individual accounts of monetary and 
financial authorities. For example, if oil prices fall, the federal budget of Russia will be in 
short supply, and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation will receive huge amounts 
from international reserve revaluation, which it does not transfer to the federal budget, but 
retains it before their reevaluation is necessary. With oil price increase, the situation will 
be diametrically opposite. 
Non-Cyclical Coordination Of Monetary And Financial Authorities 
Coordination can be carried out between the monetary and financial authorities, 
not only within the framework of countercyclical policies, but also within the framework of 
price stability achievement, ensuring the stability of the national currency exchange rate, 
budget fund spending, economic growth acceleration, etc. 
Price stability coordination provision 
The modern economy does not intend to achieve absolute price stability. In 
conditions of price stability, the price level should change slowly and predictably. This 
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requires an impact on monetary and non-monetary inflation minimization. The central 
bank should be responsible for monetary inflation, and the government - for non-
monetary, as the first is conditioned by excessive expansion of the money supply, and the 
second - by the increase of tariffs and regulated prices of natural monopolists. The 
problem is to assess the “contribution” to the overall inflation of the monetary and non-
monetary components. If this was done objectively and unambiguously, then the monetary 
authorities and the government could be blamed for the corresponding component of 
inflation. 
Central banks usually target non-zero inflation, which is primarily due to the 
existence of non-monetary inflation, which it cannot affect (Slepov & Volkov, 2017). Any 
attempts to target zero inflation would lead to economy recession. This can be 
demonstrated using the equation of exchange: MV = PQ, where M is the amount of 
money, V is the speed of money circulation, P is the price level, Q is the number of goods 
sold. 
Let's consider this equation in relation to two sectors of the economy: the sector of 
regulated prices and tariffs - the sector of natural monopolies (sector 1) and the 
competitive sector (sector 2):   
MV = Σpnqn + Σpmqm, 
Σpnqn is the sum of prices of goods in the sector of regulated prices and tariffs (n 
of goods), and Σpmqm is the sum of prices of goods in the competitive sector (m of goods). 
In the conditions of stable money supply, the increase of prices among natural 
monopolists will lead to the price sum increase of sector 1. The goods in this sector are 
the goods that are difficult to refuse for economic entities and demand is inelastic. Given 
the stability of the money supply, MV = constant and with the growth of natural monopolist 
prices, the sum of the prices of goods in sector 2 will be decreased, and this will be due 
to a certain drop of prices and real output reduction. In sector 2, they could not provide 
full compensation of price fall to increase the sum of prices in sector 1 due to the fact that 
there must be some correlation between the prices of the two sectors, which can vary 
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within certain limits. Thus, the rise of prices in sector 1 reduces the real volume of 
production in sector 2. The total volume of national production (GDP) also decreases. To 
prevent this, the central bank must increase the money supply, but this will lead to higher 
prices. This is the mechanism of monetary inflation. 
Since 2015, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation has set the inflation target 
of 4%, justifying this by the existence of predominantly non-monetary inflation. In fact, 
annual inflation was less than 4% in 2015 - 2019. In order to reduce non-monetary 
inflation, the Government of the Russian Federation indexed many tariffs by the value 
slightly lower than actual inflation. It can be assumed that this provided some effect on 
non-monetary inflation reduction. Indexation of tariffs at the rate lower than inflation rate 
should contribute to the natural monopoly sector efficiency increase. 
Economic growth acceleration coordination 
It is generally accepted that the central bank cannot influence the country economic 
potential using monetary policy; by affecting aggregate demand, it can reduce the 
deviation of actual GDP from potential GDP. The government has a greater arsenal of 
means to influence structural changes in the economy, reduce administrative barriers, and 
so on. 
Understanding of this separation of functions between the central bank and the 
government cannot always be accepted. So, for example, the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation places abroad huge volumes of accumulated financial resources. This holds 
back domestic investment and economic growth, because, as you know, investment is an 
important factor in economic growth. Thus, the argument of the monetary authorities in 
Russia about the impossibility of the Central Bank to influence the change in the economic 
potential of the country can be considered unfounded (Main directions of the unified state 
monetary policy for 2020 and the period 2021 and 2022). In Russia, the transformation of 
external investments into domestic ones is necessary. In this regard, it is necessary to 
coordinate the actions of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the Government 
of the Russian Federation to form an adequate financial and investment mechanism for 
the allocation of these funds. 
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One should also consider such a channel of the central bank influence on economic 
growth as the interest rate. The central bank can influence the real interest rate by 
activating or holding back investments (Monetary and fiscal policy coordination, 2011).  
On the contrary, by raising the interest rate, the central bank makes investments 
unprofitable, and this can lead to even greater growth of public debt and the state budget 
deficit. The real interest rate reduction may prompt the government to finance the budget 
deficit through government borrowing (Burlachkov, 2012). This requires interaction 
between the government and the central bank to manage interest rates. 
Coordination of budgetary fund spending 
The government places huge financial resources in the central bank, - the remains 
of budget funds. In Russia, the Ministry of Finance keeps part of the funds of the National 
Wealth Fund at the Central Bank, and earlier it placed the funds of the Reserve Fund and 
the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation. Replenishment and spending of 
budgetary funds is accompanied by money supply increase or decrease. Writing off 
budget funds from the federal budget account requires the Central Bank to issue money, 
which can be produced in such volumes that it will affect the price level. Therefore, there 
was an acute problem of budget spending uniformity in Russia for a long time. This 
unevenness was an additional inflation factor. The interaction of the Ministry of Finance 
and the central bank can ensure stability in the dynamics of money supply and greater 
control over price stability. 
Coordination during national currency stability provision 
In the modern world, the dominant exchange rate regime is free float, and central 
banks are not responsible for the stability of the national currency, but are responsible for 
price stability. But, despite this, the central bank and the government should not create 
excessive volatility of the national currency by their actions. The regime of controlled 
floating, and, especially, a fixed rate, significantly limits the actions of the central bank, 
which requires the creation of a special system to coordinate the actions of the monetary 
and financial authorities. This restriction follows from the trilemma of international finance 
about the “impossible trinity” - the impossibility of simultaneously achievement of three 
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things: a fixed (controlled) exchange rate of the national currency, free movement of 
capital and an independent monetary policy of the central bank (Soghomonyan, 2013). 
Providing of capital free floating, as the inevitability in the modern world, the central bank 
in the conditions of national currency fixed rate or controlled floating, loses the 
independence of monetary policy, which means the reduction of its possible actions. In 
these conditions, the main role is given to fiscal policy, which is not capable of 
macroeconomic stabilization measure effective implementation (Golovnin, 2017). 
The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are macroeconomic entities; their 
financial operations affect the system of internal and external equilibrium of the national 
economy. The spending of state reserves by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian 
Federation placed in foreign currency leads to foreign currency supply increase in the 
foreign market, which affects the exchange rate of the national currency. Therefore, such 
operations should be coordinated with the Central Bank and agreed with monetary policy. 
Russia Experience In Fiscal And Monetary Policy Coordination 
The urgent need for fiscal and monetary policy harmonization emerged in the early 
2000-ies. During this period, the price of oil in world markets began to increase, which 
increased the influx of foreign currency into the Russian economy. The appreciation of the 
ruble reduced the competitiveness of national goods in the domestic and foreign markets. 
Under these conditions, there was the fear that oil price decline (which usually happens 
rapidly) will lead to the national currency devaluation and economy destabilization. The 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation pursued the policy of the national currency 
strengthening restriction, for which it acquired foreign currency in the domestic market. 
However, the capabilities of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation were limited. In 
order to acquire more and more foreign currency, it was necessary to expand the money 
supply, which led to higher prices and the strengthening of the real ruble exchange rate, 
while the nominal exchange rate did not change. Thus, the Central Bank of the Russian 
Federation could not achieve the goal - the national currency real rate stability. 
 The increase of oil prices led to federal budget revenue increase, which were 
formed mainly due to customs payment increase of increasing volume of imports. The 
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Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation understood that it is not worth to expand 
budget expenditure significantly due to temporary growth of budget revenues. High oil 
prices were initially seen as something unrealistic that cannot last long and that the oil 
market would correct itself. This led to the accumulation of significant federal budget 
surpluses for 2002-2003 on the account of the Federal Treasury, which was opened at 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. 
All this served as an objective basis for the need to coordinate the monetary policy 
of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation with the fiscal policy of the RF Government. 
Thus, an automatic mechanism was created for macroeconomic balance of internal and 
external equilibrium in the Russian economy, which provides for the creation of the 
Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation, which began to function in 2004. The 
Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation made it possible to balance the federal 
budget (dynamic balancing over a number of years) and balance the equilibrium of 
payments in terms of the national currency controlled floating implementation.  
The coordination mechanism of fiscal and monetary policy was as follows (see 
table. 2): 
1. The RF Government has introduced the binding of export customs duty rate on 
crude oil to the average price of Urals crude oil prevailing in the oil markets (Mediterranean 
and Rotterdam) ( Law of the Russian Federation No. 5003-1 of 21.05.1993 "on the 
customs tariff", 1993).  As oil prices rose, its export customs duties also increased. In fact, 
the RF Government seized part of the natural rent generated by them from oil companies 
during such a favorable period by raising duty rates. The excess of import customs duties 
on oil over its base level was directed to the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation. 
Thus, the Government of the Russian Federation sent to the financial reserve the so-
called “opportunistic” federal budget revenues, which were placed in the Central Bank of 
the Russian Federation. 
2. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation received the opportunity to 
purchase foreign currency in order to prevent the appreciation of the ruble at the expense 
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of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the increase of oil prices 
automatically provided it with non-emission sources of funds to sterilize the money supply. 
Subsequently, the Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation was transformed 
by dividing its funds into the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare Fund of the Russian 
Federation. In a modified form, the RF Reserve Fund actually began to fulfill the function 
of the RF Stabilization Fund, and the RF National Welfare Fund began to represent the 
fund for future generation per se, or at least the long-term budget equalization fund.  
Table 2. The matrix of the RF Government and the RF Central Bank coordination 
mechanism (2000-ies)* 
Public sector High price of oil Low oil price 
Financial 
authority 
sector 
Ministry of Finance increases 
financial reserves 
Ministry of Finance spends 
financial reserves 
Stabilization fund value growth Spending from the Stabilization 
Fund 
Monetary 
Authority 
Sector 
Central Bank Increases Foreign 
Exchange Reserves 
Central Bank sells foreign 
currency 
Growth of international 
reserves 
Reduction of international 
reserves 
* Author development.  
The Russian coordination mechanism between the financial and monetary 
authorities did not take into account the peculiarities of their receipt of "profits" and 
"losses" in the framework of this. Of course, the Ministry of Finance cannot make profit or 
loss; such economic categories are usually used in relation to organizations. In relation to 
the federal budget, by profits and losses, the authors understand the economic gain or 
economic loss.  
They depreciated the means of the RF Stabilization Fund located in the Central 
Bank of the Russian Federation. This was due to the fact that they were denominated in 
national currency, and the RF Central Bank did not accrue interest on them. The refusal 
to charge interest was due to the fact that the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, in 
order to achieve balance of payments, had to place the fund assets in foreign currency, 
which depreciated. This led to a negative revaluation of the currency reserves of the RF 
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Central Bank and its capital reduction. There was the danger that the capital of the RF 
Central Bank could become negative. Thus, financial and monetary authorities suffered 
“losses” from their economic policies. In case of oil price fall, the RF Central Bank should 
have overestimated its foreign exchange reserves, having obtained a positive financial 
result and transferred part of it to the federal budget. 
Subsequently, it was decided to place the funds of the Stabilization Fund of the Russian 
Federation in the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in foreign currency. In this case, 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation did not incur losses from the revaluation of 
that part of the international reserves that reflected the placement of assets of the 
Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation in national currency, and the Ministry of 
Finance of the Russian Federation received interest income from the placement of RF 
Central Bank assets to the RF Stabilization Fund. 
 
Conclusions  
 
To summarize the abovementioned, the following main conclusions can be drawn: 
First, the modern economic policy is characterized by dichotomy, which is carried 
out by two independent authorities - monetary and financial. To increase the effectiveness 
of economic policy, there must be coherence between these two types of economic 
authorities, which allows to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies. 
The second - in the framework of countercyclical economic policy, a variety of 
combinations of instruments and the trends of their use by the economic authorities are 
possible. All this potentially increases the effectiveness of the economic instruments used 
by the central bank and the government. A significant limitation here is the presence of a 
“political tint” of economic decisions that may be desirable for society or be criticized. This 
raises the problem of asymmetry in countercyclical policies. 
Third, as part of the economic cycle, the financial condition of the central bank and 
the state budget are usually changed in antiphase. This imposes a limitation on the 
decision space of each of the economic authorities. It seems appropriate to create a 
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financial mechanism (financial mechanisms) for automatic or semi-automatic 
redistribution of wealth between the central bank and the state budget. The volatility of the 
financial condition of the consolidated account between the central bank and the state 
budget is less than the volatility of each of their accounts separately. 
Fourth, in Russia, the coordination of actions between the monetary and financial 
authorities has been most vividly implemented since 2004, when the RF Stabilization 
Fund was created. This Fund allowed to solve two important problems simultaneously in 
two areas - fiscal and monetary. With its help, it was possible to carry out dynamic 
balancing of the federal budget (over several years) and, at the same time, solve the 
problem of inflationary process management and the national currency targeting, that is, 
to increase the stability of the main macroeconomic indicators in the short and long term. 
The potential interaction between the monetary and financial authorities is not 
limited to the ones discussed above. The challenges from the global economy and the 
global financial system will lead to the creation of new economic instruments and the 
development of more effective interaction ways between monetary and financial 
authorities. 
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